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Abstract. High seroprevalence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) among camels has
been reported in Kenya and other countries in Africa. To date, the only report of MERS-CoV seropositivity among
humans in Kenya is of two livestock keepers with no known contact with camels. We assessed whether persons
exposed to seropositive camels at household level had serological evidence of infection. In 2013, 760 human and
879 camel sera were collected from 275 and 85 households respectively in Marsabit County. Data on human and
animal demographics and type of contact with camels were collected. Human and camel sera were tested for anti-
MERS-CoV IgG using a commercial enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test. Human samples were con-
firmed by plaque reduction neutralization test (PRNT). Logistic regression was used to identify factors associated with
seropositivity. The median age of persons sampled was 30 years (range: 5–90) and 50% were males. A quarter (197/
760) of the participants reported having had contact with camels defined as milking, feeding, watering, slaughtering, or
herding. Of the human sera, 18 (2.4%) were positive on ELISA but negative by PRNT. Of the camel sera, 791 (90%)
were positive on ELISA. On univariate analysis, higher prevalence was observed in female and older camels over 4
years of age (P < 0.05). On multivariate analysis, only age remained significantly associated with increased odds of
seropositivity. Despite high seroprevalence among camels, there was no serological confirmation of MERS-CoV infec-
tion among camel pastoralists in Marsabit County. The high seropositivity suggests that MERS-CoV or other closely
related virus continues to circulate in camels and highlights ongoing potential for animal-to-human transmission.
INTRODUCTION
In September 2012, Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first detected in humans, and
as of June 2016, 1,733 laboratory-confirmed human cases
and 628 deaths had been reported to the World health
Organization (WHO) from 27 countries.1 The majority of the
cases have been reported from Arabian Peninsula, but cases
imported to other countries have caused large hospital-
linked outbreaks, such as in South Korea, in 2015.1 Severe
respiratory disease and death rate is higher in infections
among older patients and those with preexisting conditions.2–4
Dromedary camels have been identified as a potential reser-
voir for the virus after detection of virus in camels in Saudi
Arabia, Oman, and Qatar,5–7 and of a high level of sero-
prevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies in camel populations
from a wider range of countries including countries in the
Middle East and Africa.8–14 Notably, however, Australia has
documented absence of MERS-CoV antibodies among
camels.15,16 Most MERS-CoV infections in humans are not
linked to camel exposure and are thought to be due to
human-to-human transmission particularly in health-care set-
tings. The low frequency of camel-to-human infections is
supported by the finding that MERS-CoV seroprevalence
among the general human population in Saudi Arabia is less
than 0.5%, though significantly higher in camel shepherds
(2.3%) and slaughterhouse workers (3.6%).17
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the
world population of camels in 2001 was 19 million camels,
of which, 17 million were dromedary camels and approxi-
mately 65% of these were found in the eastern African
countries of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya.18 Despite
the fact that the majority of dromedary camels are in Africa,
no case of MERS-CoV in humans has been reported in
Africa, except for a cluster of three family members in
Tunisia, in 2013, associated with an imported index case
and no history of exposure to camels.19 A retrospective
study carried out in Kenya detected MERS-CoV antibodies
in more than 90% of camels from various parts of the coun-
try.8 A recent study that analyzed > 1,000 human sera from
among pastoralists who did not keep camels reported two
likely asymptomatic humans (< 0.2%) positive for MERS-
CoV neutralizing antibodies.20
To understand the risk of transmission between camels
and humans living in close contact, we conducted a sero-
survey in camels and humans in same households to deter-
mine the prevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies among pastoral
communities in northern Kenya that live in close association
with camels and investigated risk factors associated with
seropositivity in camels and humans.
METHODS
Study site and design. In 2013, we conducted a cross-
sectional serosurvey of humans and camels in Marsabit
County,21 using a two-stage random sampling methodology.
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First, 10% (N = 10) of sublocations (the smallest official
administrative unit in the county) were randomly selected
representing pastoral, agropastoral, and periurban livestock
production systems, then households were randomly selected
(weighted by sublocation human population) from each sub-
location through random geographical coordinates gener-
ated using ArcGIS as previously described.21 Households
were enrolled irrespective of animal ownership, and in each
household, a maximum of three persons over 5 years of age
were randomly selected and enrolled after providing informed
consent. Random selection of camels was attempted and
sampling was based on herd size: all camels in households
with < 15 camels were sampled and up to 15 camels in
households with larger herd sizes.
Sample collection and transportation. A 5-mL venous
blood sample was collected from enrolled persons and a
structured questionnaire was administered to collect infor-
mation on individual factors such as demographics, medi-
cal history, animal ownership, and exposure to animals and
animal products, as well as household risk factors such as
socioeconomic status and size of household. Contact with
camels was defined as milking, feeding, watering, slaugh-
tering, or herding camels and for those who reported con-
tact, the frequency for each type of contact was recorded.
Blood samples were obtained from selected camels from the
jugular vein. Serum samples were obtained daily after centri-
fugation of coagulated blood sample at 3,000 × g for 15 minutes
at the nearest health center at the end of each day, stored
at −20°C, and later shipped in dry ice for storage at
−20°C at the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI)/
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) labora-
tory in Kisumu (human samples) and the Central Veterinary
Laboratory in Nairobi (camel samples). Sera were subse-
quently thawed, aliquoted, and one aliquot was shipped to
the University of Bonn, Germany, on dry ice for MERS-CoV
antibody testing. On arrival, samples were stored at −80°C
before testing.
Serological testing. Before conducting serological anal-
ysis, all serum samples were heat inactivated at 56°C for
30 minutes. For the human sera, a two-step approach rec-
ommended by the WHO for the detection of antibodies against
MERS-CoV was used.22 In a first step, screening for anti-
MERS-CoV IgG was carried out using a commercial enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) kit (EUROIMMUN AG,
Lübeck, Germany). In a second step, all ELISA-positive sera
were tested for MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies by plaque
reduction neutralization test (PRNT) for confirmation. For the
ELISA test, all human sera were tested at 1:100 dilution and
an optical density ratio of 0.3 used as cutoff.23 For PRNT,
serial dilutions of sera starting with a 1:10 dilution were incu-
bated with the virus. The serum dilution resulting in at least
50% plaque reduction (PRNT50) was recorded. The 1:20
dilution was ranked as the lowest possible diagnostically
significant titer as evaluated previously.23,24
For the camel sera, the anti-MERS-CoV ELISA Camel IgG
ELISA kit was used at a sera dilution of 1:100 (EUROIMMUN
AG) as described previously.8,10,11 An optical density ratio of
0.4 was used as cutoff as exhaustively evaluated in several
studies before, including investigation of camels sampled at
the same geographic region in Africa.8,10,11
Data analysis. All analyses were done using STATA 12
(Stata Corporation, College Station, TX). MERS-CoV sero-
positivity in humans was defined as specimens that tested
positive to MERS-CoV by PRNT, whereas in camels it was
defined as sera that tested positive by ELISA. To account
for clustering, the study design strata (livestock production
systems) were specified and the primary (sublocation) and
secondary (household) sampling units were defined. All
analyses were subsequently carried out while accounting
for clustering by applying the prefix svy in Stata 12. Overall
seroprevalence was determined and thereafter seropositiv-
ity was determined for each herd and by sublocation. Analysis
of variance was used to compare differences in seropreva-
lence by sublocation.
Univariate analysis was conducted at animal population
and herd levels. The animal population level analysis used
the MERS-CoV serostatus as response variable and animal-
level factors (age and sex) and herd-level explanatory vari-
ables (e.g., herd size of different livestock species, having
bought or sold animals) as covariates. Univariate analysis
was conducted for explanatory variables and those with a
P value < 0.2 were taken into the multivariate logistic regres-
sion model. Multivariate logistic regression was used to iden-
tify factors associated with MERS-CoV seropositivity at herd
level while controlling for other covariates.
Ethical clearance. Ethical clearance and approval were
obtained from the KEMRI Scientific Ethical Review commit-
tee, the CDC Institutional Review Board, and the Ministry of
Agriculture Livestock and Fisheries for additional testing of
archived sera. Permits for the import of camel sera into
Europe were given by the responsible German authority.
RESULTS
Human. A total of 760 persons distributed in 275 house-
holds in 10 sublocations were sampled. Of the 275 house-
holds, 85 (30.9%) owned camels. The median age was 30 years
(range: 5–90); 50% were males and 50% were farmers or
worked on the farm (Table 1).
TABLE 1
Household and demographic characteristics of persons tested for
exposure to Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus,
Kenya 2013 (N = 760)
Household characteristics Number (%)
Number of households 275
Number of households owning camels (%) 85 (30.9)
Camels owned per household; median (range) 20 (1,50)
Individual characteristics
Number of individuals 760
Sex: male number (%) 382 (50.3)
Age: median (range) 30 (5–90)
Mean (standard deviation) 34.3 (19.8)
Education level completed
Postsecondary/secondary 52 (6.8)
Primary/preprimary 194 (25.5)
No education 514 (67.6)
Occupation
Works on farm/farmer 379 (49.9)
Salaried, off farm, skilled 42 (5.5)
Housewife 58 (7.6)
Salaried, off farm, unskilled 90 (11.8)
Student 174 (22.9)
Other 17 (2.2)
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Of the 760 sera tested by ELISA, 18 (2.4%) were positive,
and all were from different households (Figure 1). None of
these 18 sera were confirmed for MERS-CoV by PRNT.
Human exposure to camels. A total of 197/760 (25.9%)
of the participants reported having had contact with camels
in the last year. Of these, 40% and 30% reported daily milking
and herding camels, respectively. A quarter of the partic-
ipants reported daily consumption of unboiled camel milk
(Table 2).
Camel. Prevalence by herd and sublocation. Camel sam-
ples were drawn from 85 herds distributed in eight of 10 sub-
locations (Figure 2). None of the selected households in
two sublocations (Gurumesa and Dambala Fachana) owned
camels and hence no camels were available for sampling in
two sublocations (Figure 2). In camels, the overall seropreva-
lence of MERS-CoV antibodies by ELISA test in the sampled
population was 90% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 88–92)
(Figure 1). At least one camel tested positive in each of the
85 herds and in 59% (50/85) of the herds all camels tested
positive. The lowest seroprevalence by herd was 26.7%
(95% CI = 7.8–55.1). Seroprevalence by sublocation was
highest at 100% in Majengo sublocation and lowest in Rukesa
Qarsa sublocation at 69.6%. Herd seropositivity varied sig-
nificantly by sampling sublocation (F(7,77) = 5.73, P < 0.001).
Risk factors for camel seropositivity to MERS-CoV. On
univariate analysis, significantly higher prevalence was
observed in female camels (93%; χ2 = 23.9, P < 0.05) com-
pared with male camels (81%) and in camels 4 years of age
or older compared with those camels less than 4 years of
age (χ2 = 129, P < 0.05) (Table 3). Also, the total number of
cattle in the camel herd was significantly associated with
marginally decreased odds of MERS-CoV seropositivity. Of
the 85 camel-owning herds, 74 (87%) owned at least one
other livestock of cattle, sheep, and goats. On multivariate
analysis, only age remained significantly associated with
increased odds of being seropositive to MERS-CoV.
DISCUSSION
We found that all camel herds in Marsabit showed evi-
dence of past MERS-CoV infection and 90% of all camels
in our study tested positive for MERS-CoV antibodies.
However, none of the 760 persons that lived in close asso-
ciation with these camels tested positive for MERS-CoV
neutralizing antibodies. Our sampled human population had
very close interactions with their camels, including con-
sumption of unpasteurized milk and meat, and direct han-
dling of the animals during routine husbandry practices
such as milking, herding, slaughtering, and assisting with
births. These camel–human interactions provided ample
opportunities for human contact with camels and their
products such as meat, milk, nasal secretions, and feces
FIGURE 1. Frequency distribution plot. Frequency of all Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) IgG enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) optical density (OD) ratios grouped in classes of 0.01 for human samples (A) and 0.1 for dromedary camel
samples (B). The vertical dashed lines represent the ELISA cutoff value as determined in several studies before. The values given on the x axis
represent the upper bound of the corresponding class.
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from camels, all of which are potential transmission path-
ways for the virus.6,25,26 Yet, none of these exposed per-
sons tested positive for MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies
that are specific for MERS-CoV infection. Our findings sug-
gest no camel-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV in the
area at the time of the study.
However, though we found no evidence of infection in
this human population exposed to camels, a serosurvey of
approximately 1,000 individuals in Kenya found two sero-
positive individuals among Kenyan pastoralists, confirmed
by PRNT, but neither had reported contact with camels
nor travel history and keeping camels was uncommon
among pastoralist in the region, suggesting the exposures
could have been unrelated to contact with camels.20 It is
also possible that the MERS-CoV circulating in Kenya,
may be antigenically different from the Middle East–
derived virus used in the PRNT in both studies, rendering
the PRNT test less sensitive. Furthermore, the lack of
detectable neutralizing antibodies in humans in our study
could also have been due to the possibility of short life
span of anti-MERS-CoV antibodies in humans, as suggested
in a recent study.27
However, the high seroprevalence among the younger
camels in our study (73%) suggests continuous and recent
circulation of MERS-CoV in camel herds in Kenya and pos-
sible risk of transmission to humans that have frequent direct
contact to them. In Saudi Arabia, persons with occupational
exposures to camels were found to be at a significantly
increased risk of up to 23 times of being seropositive.17
Although camel-to-human transmission occurs infrequently
in the Arabian Peninsula, and possibly in other regions of
Kenya,20 the lack of evidence of any previous exposure
to MERS-CoV among the pastoralist community was unex-
pected. Despite the study being in a camel pastoralist
region, only 30% of the households owned camels and 26%
of the participants reported direct contact with camels. Given
that virus shedding in camels may be seasonal and associ-
ated with the reproduction cycle28and the potentially waning
immunity in subclinical human infections,27 it is possible that
the sample size was not sufficient and the study period pro-
vided a limited opportunity to detect previous infections to
make conclusive statement on exposure status among
humans in Kenya. In addition, the camels were not evaluated
from active infection status or compatible clinical presen-
tation. However, given our sample size, this study suggests
that among all camel pastoralists the true seroprevalence is
lower than 0.4% at 97.5% confidence level (Binomial exact
one-sided CI). In addition, considering that the sampled per-
sons represents a population with high exposure to camels,
the continued lack of reported human cases in Africa despite
evidence of high and widespread exposure of dromedary
camels to MERS-CoV or other related viruses presents a
pertinent question on the epidemiology of the disease in
different ecologies.
The MERS-CoV circulating in the camels in Kenya has
not been isolated or sequenced, but it seems possible that
virus strains circulating in camels in the Middle East and in
Africa might differ in their ability to efficiently transmit from
camels to humans. Possible reasons for lack of camel-to-
human transmission in our study region compared with the
Arabian Peninsula might be different characteristics of the
circulating virus strains itself. Such virus-intrinsic factors
which could alter zoonotic transmission rates might include
different phenotypes, pathogenicity, and the ability to sur-
vive in the environment. The differences in the environ-
mental conditions in Kenya compared with the Arabian
Peninsula might also explain the differences in the rate of
camel-to-human transmission events. Of note, an ecological
study that compared the environmental conditions under
which camel-to-human cases occur with those of the broader
population of all human MERS-CoV cases suggested that
better camel-to-human virus transmission occurs under a
narrow set of environmental conditions.29 Such conditions
could be absent in Marsabit County, hence limited virus trans-
mission from camels to humans.
Some of the hypotheses presented to explain the appar-
ent disparity between camel-to-human transmission in the
Middle East and Africa include different risk profiles related
to different camel farming systems. In the Middle East,
camel farming is mostly semi-intensive and intensive sys-
tem where camels are housed and stall fed to maximize
productivity for meat and milk as opposed to most of Africa
where camel farming is mainly extensive and camels roam
over extensive areas in search of pasture and water.30 The
intensive farming characterized by livestock sheds could
present greater opportunity for virus survival and trans-
mission from camels to humans.
TABLE 2
Characteristics of contact with camels of persons tested for exposure
to Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus from Marsabit,
Kenya 2013
Characteristic Response
No. (%)
N = 197
Contact (milk, feed, water,
slaughter, or herd)
with camels
Yes 197/760 (26)
Frequency of
feeding/watering camels
Daily 43 (22)
Several times a month 100 (51)
Rarely 27 (14)
Never 27 (14)
Frequency of milking camels Daily 78 (40)
Several times a month 46 (23)
Rarely 20 (10)
Never 53 (27)
Frequency of slaughtering
or handling meat camels
Daily 17 (9)
Several times a month 14 (7)
Rarely 64 (32)
Never 102 (52)
Frequency of herding camels Daily 59 (30)
Several times a month 76 (39)
Rarely 32 (16)
Never 30 (15)
Frequency of assistance
with births in camels
Sometimes 79 (40)
Rarely 38 (19)
Never 80 (41)
Frequency of consumption
of unboiled camel milk
(N = 706)
Daily 180 (25)
Occasionally 254 (36)
Never 272 (38)
Frequency of consumption
of boiled camel milk
Daily 51 (7)
Occasionally 137 (19)
Never 518 (73)
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This study characterizes the local practices of this pas-
toralist community in reference to camels and highlights
the extensive direct contact of the people with camels in
natural settings that could facilitate transmission of virus
from camels to humans. Studies focusing on humans with
occupational exposure to camels in Africa where MERS-
COV in camels has been reported but no human cases are
key in elucidating the ecology of the virus in this region.
This study suggests likely reduced transmissibility of the
MERS-COV from camels to humans in Kenya compared
with similarly occupationally exposed persons in Saudi
Arabia though the mechanism is unclear. Longitudinal stud-
ies among the camel pastoralist communities to explore
possibility of mild infections associated with waning immu-
nity to MERS-COV, coupled with studies focusing on finding
the virus in camel herds and characterization of MERS-CoV
strains in camels in Kenya to compare with strains from
Middle East and elsewhere is an important gap. In addi-
tion, enhanced surveillance of MERS-CoV in human popu-
lations especially in camel-raising areas, and increased
vigilance in hospitals for all unusual cases of severe respi-
ratory disease, especially among persons who have trav-
eled internationally to areas with active virus transmission
is key with prepared in-hospital infection control plans to
FIGURE 2. Map of Marsabit County showing seroprevalence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in camels by
sublocations. Inset is a map of Kenya showing county boundaries.
1322 MUNYUA, CORMAN AND OTHERS
prevent rapid nosocomial transmission of MERS-CoV as
previously seen.
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